On 10 August 2003, I posted this colossal piece on the SPECULATIONS Rumor Mill site. Now that the SYDNEY's wreck has been located, here it is again, at full velocity. I'm greatly obliged to Tom Williams for letting me know about the finding. (Tom, I couldn't find the post in my own Mill topic, and then thought: did I really hijack Tom's topic with that huge post? I did; I blush; I repeat my obligation to you for letting me know.)
As an introduction: HMAS SYDNEY was an Australian light cruiser (not 'battle' cruiser, as CNN reports) in the Royal Australian Navy in World War II. She was sent to the Mediterranean in 1940, and fought successfully against the Italian navy. After a partial refit, she returned to Australian waters in January 1941, based out of Perth. Early in November 1941, she escorted a troopship toward Singapore. On the way back, she interecepted the German Raider KORMORAN on 19 November. SYDNEY was a new (built in 1936) light cruiser, much faster, better armored, and somewhat more heavily gunned, than KORMORAN. The ships fought. KORMORAN was immobilized after a lucky hit to her engine room. SYDNEY in turn, was hard hit, and torpedoed to boot, by KORMORAN. SYDNEY fled the scene. In the several hours it took to abandon KORMORAN, her crew watched the burning SYDNEY move beyond the horizon. As darkness fell, light from the fires could be seen, vanishing sometime after midnight. Most of KORMORAN' s crew that had survived the battle were picked up by the Australians in the next week. SYDNEY was never seen again until her recent finding. None of her crew was saved, and only three pieces of wreckage were ever located. Truly, David killed Goliath in this battle. It was a great shock to Australians. I've often thought SYDNEY's loss was the Australian equivalent of what Pearl Harbor did to America. There was a great difference: the mystery of what really happened. All the accounts of the battle came from the German side. Not surprisingly, many Australians didn't find them palatable. Conspiracy theories began to flourish. In 1999, an Australian train driver and engineer, Wesley Olson, published a book: BITTER VICTORY: THE DEATH OF HMAS SYDNEY, that tried to clear up the mystery. I think he did so. What follows is my take on Olson's book:
From the RUMOR MILL, 10 August 2003, Tom Williams's author topic:
This enormous post began as a brief reply to TomW and DaveK who asked me some questions about a hymn to BITTER VICTORY by Wesley Olson, which I posted in the "What are YOU Reading" topic, message 1154. I had hoped just to answer, but the post just growed, and is now in process of being turned into an article. Forward:
For Dave: I had a look at the website you mentioned and was mightily impressed. Yet the STEPHEN HOPKINS's experience as an American merchant ship that sunk a German surface raider in War II, was not the norm. The British experience was far different, and worse. Usually when the raider met a Royal Navy (RN) ship, it was the Royal Navy that came out second best, unless the RN ship was a lot bigger, and more heavily armed. Even then, the Germans were no pushovers, as what happened to SYDNEY shows.
For Tom: What does Olson think? This is my summary of his 422 page book:
First, there's what Olson calls the "tonnage war." In 1939-41 the Germans were sinking ships far faster than the Allies could build them. By the spring of 1941, the losses exceeded new construction by about 3.5 to 1. The Admiralty responded to this pressure by issuing an instruction to its captains to put the highest priority on capturing enemy MERCHANT ships. There was an additional incentive: doing so got the captain and crew prize money for the capture.
Second, SYDNEY herself. She had faults. The most important was the secondary armament, four 4-inch guns. Their gun crews were not protected, which meant that in a close action, the guns could not be fired, unless the gun crew was willing to be slaughtered. Two other important flaws were having only a single station for director firing, that is, a station where all of SYDNEY's main armament could be controlled and fired. Next, the ship still had a great many wooden furnishings, and the metal portions of the hull had several coats of oil based paint. Finally, all the guns were electric powered, with inadequate backup if the power failed. More, the main switchboard was not beneath the waterline, and was comparatively unprotected from shell fire.
SYDNEY's captain, Joseph Burnett, knew of the 4-inch gun shield flaws at least, and had requested they be repaired. But there was never enough time, and SYDNEY's being stationed in Australia in 1941 put her far below the modification priorities list compared to ships in the Mediterranean. Ironically, if SYDNEY had been seriously damaged, before November 1941, these changes would likely have been made.
Third, the captain and crew. SYDNEY had fought in the Mediterranean in 1940, and had an experienced crew and officers. But nearly all the officers were replaced in the spring of 1941, including Captain Burnett. While the replacements, had had six months to learn the ropes, they had done so in a quiet zone, without being under fire.
The turnover among crew was even greater. So while SYDNEY had a professional crew, it was untested. But then, I doubt if there were any ships in the Royal Navy that had a crew tested in close combat.
Olson then shows some encounters the Royal Navy had with raiders. The Royal Navy's record was mixed, sinking the raiders about as often as the raiders sank the RN ships. The most relevant was battle between CORNWALL, a Royal Navy heavy cruiser (SYDNEY was a light cruiser) and PINGUIN, in the Indian Ocean on 8 May 41. PINGUIN was spotted by CORNWALL's aircraft and chased all day. When CORNWALL finally caught up to PINGUIN, PINGUIN tried to bluff, claiming to be a Norwegian freighter. CORNWALL kept closing, and PINGUIN finally opened fire at 10,500 yards. The second salvo struck CORNWALL, penetrated, and exploded in the steering compartment. CORNWALL lost steering control, and began veering wildly. Worse, the shock had damaged the fire control equipment, and CORNWALL's shots missed by miles. CORNWALL's captain tried to steer away from PINGUIN, but was some time regaining control. In a way this was fortunate, because the rest of PINGUIN's shots and torpedoes missed. CORNWALL was able to regain control, and using her superior speed and gun range, pound PINGUIN to pieces with 8 inch shells. Yet the British Admiralty was cool toward CORNWALL's captain, being critical of the time he took before going into action. No one seems to have realized how near to disaster CORNWALL had come. This insistence on aggressive action was a staple of the Admiralty, largely because of Winston Churchill's prodding. One other bit about the Royal Navy/raider encounters: up to the SYDNEY-KORMORAN battle, invariably the firing began at a long distance. CORNWALL fired at the greatest distance, six miles. But SYDNEY was to take on KORMORAN at about three quarters of a mile.
So. On 11 November 1941, SYDNEY left Fremantle to escort a troopship to the Sunda Strait, where she would hand over and return. On 17 November, she made the rendezvous, and headed for home. She was never seen again, except by the KORMORAN. From KORMORAN's reports, the only first hand testimony, we learn that SYDNEY and KORMORAN sighted each other on 19 November at 1655, range about 20,200 yards. KORMORAN immediately headed directly away from SYDNEY. With her far greater speed (31 versus 17 knots) SYDNEY could easily overhaul her. But this meant a stern chase. If you want to identify a ship, a broadside view is best. Trying to get a broadside view, while maintaining distance is time consuming and sunset was due about 1845, less than two hours away. SYDNEY could easily lose contact. So SYDNEY gave chase, but could not readily identify the ship until she had caught up, and only then made a turn away to get a broadside view. Meanwhile, KORMORAN identified herself as the Dutch freighter STRAAT MALAKKA. A close broadside inspection would show that claim to be false, but a stern view from a longer distance would be ambiguous. KORMORAN's captain never really admitted what was going through his mind, but I think he was playing for time, gambling that he might be able to stall SYDNEY until darkness, and then get away. More, at close range, two of SYDNEY's advantages over KORMORAN would vanish:
a) at close range, SYDNEY's speed would not be able to come into play, especially if the ships were stopped. It would make SYDNEY more vulnerable to torpedoes, being less able to dodge them.
b) SYDNEY's armor would not be so protective at close ranges.
There would be a third advantage: c) The range would allow all of KORMORAN's secondary armament to come into action.
More to the point, it seems likely that when SYDNEY had closed for the close broadside inspection by 1815, she thought she had not a raider, but a raider supply ship. The difference is, supply ships weren't armed, and could be captured without too much risk, just as the Admiralty was pressing its captains to do. So SYDNEY's Captain Burnett grabbed at what he saw as an opportunity. The Germans report that as SYDNEY approached, it was warming up its scout plane, but then stopped and stood the plane down. Evidently, Captain Burnett decided he had a supply ship, not a raider. This was a mistake. Even if it wasn't necessary to use the plane to identify the KORMORAN, the plane, loaded with 120 gallons of gasoline, was a fire hazard.
SYDNEY was at another disadvantage: the British could not be absolutely sure the ship they saw was a German raider or supply ship until they boarded. The Germans knew from the beginning they were facing a Royal Navy cruiser and had no hesitation about firing, once her captain thought conditions were right.
At about 1830, SYDNEY was perhaps 1500 yards off KORMORAN's starboard quarter. SYDNEY's main armament was still trained on KORMORAN, but he secondary batteries were not manned. Nor were SYDNEY's torpedo tubes aimed at KORMORAN. SYDNEY's scout plane was still on board.
When the battle began, the German account has SYDNEY and KORMORAN firing almost simultaneously. SYDNEY's first shots, an 8 gun broadside, mostly missed. At best, one or two shells struck KORMORAN's funnel. Olson points out that doctrine for shooting at a ship the Royal Navy was trying to capture was to aim for the bridge, presumably killing the officers and stopping any scuttling orders from being issued. But the bridge of a ship is a much smaller target than the hull, and most of SYDNEY's broadside missed. What did hit didn't damage KORMORAN significantly. KORMORAN appears to have fired at SYDNEY's upperworks. We can't know what hits were made, but SYDNEY immediately stopped firing her main armament. It seems likely that the fire control tower, directly behind the bridge, was hit and disabled, stopping SYDNEY from firing. SYDNEY was able to resume firing under local control (each turret doing its own aiming and laying) but a) this took time, time KORMORAN used to hit SYDNEY again and b) local control firing is usually less accurate than director firing. Worse, if the director tower was hit, almost surely the bridge, where Captain Burnett was supposed to be during battle, was hit too. Did such hits kill or severely wound him? Probably. The armor plating surrounding the tower and the wheelhouse was about half an inch thick, which was grossly inadequate against 5.9 inch shells fired at 1500 yards.
KORMORAN continued firing while SYDNEY struggled to regain shooting control. KORMORAN's shots seem to have been concentrated on SYDNEY's upper works. Since SYDNEY's secondary armament was unshielded, this meant the gun crews could not get to their guns without being killed. Nor could SYDNEY's port torpedo tubes be manned, for the same reason. Meanwhile, KORMORAN fired torpedoes at SYDNEY. At 1500 meters, with the ships traveling no faster than 14 knots, it would be difficult to miss. KORMORAN didn't; one torpedo struck SYDNEY just in front of her bow turrets. A huge cloud of smoke erupted from the hit, making it still harder for SYDNEY to aim her shots. The two forward turrets never fired another shot aafter the torpedo hit. The stern turrets had fired shots in local control and had succeeded in scoring several hits. SYDNEY then turned toward KORMORAN. This was orthodox tactics; you are trying to "comb" any torpedoes coming toward the ship, so they will miss. But this also masked the after turrets from KORMORAN, leaving SYDNEY unable to return ANY fire. KORMORAN continued to fire, and succeeded in toppling SYDNEY's foremast. This was the mast the main AND auxiliary radio aerials ran up. Result: no radio from SYDNEY. SYDNEY crossed KORMORAN's stern and headed south, bearing about 225 degrees. KORMORAN's port gun batteries began firing at SYDNEY, but SYDNEY did not return fire. Again, SYDNEY's secondary armament couldn't be used because it was unshielded and the gun crews would have been slaughtered. But the stern turrets of the main armament didn't respond either. They remained in the position they had been when firing at SYDNEY before the torpedo hit. This suggests that the shock of torpedo hit had blown the stern turrets off their tracks, locking them in place, facing AWAY from KORMORAN. More, the torpedo hit left SYDNEY down by the bows, and with a list to port, making SYDNEY's gun aiming more difficult. It also raised the armor belt out of the water, leaving SYDNEY far more vulnerable to the fire that KORMORAN rained on her. SYDNEY was able to fire her starboard torpedoes at KORMORAN, but all missed. About 1900, KORMORAN's captain ordered a cease fire. SYDNEY continued steaming away from KORMORAN at about 6 knots. She was burning all over, was down by the bows enough that her propellers surfaced from time to time, and had a perceptible list. KORMORAN fired another torpedo at SYDNEY, but this one missed.
What of the shots SYDNEY had fired at KORMORAN? SYDNEY had scored several hits. Two were important. The first one exploded in the engine room, and set an oil bunker on fire. The second one destroyed the main fire fighting system. The auxiliary system could not contain the fires, and by 1900 the engine room had to be abandoned and KORMORAN stopped. The fire could not be brought under control, and eventually the ship was abandoned and scuttled about midnight. All this time, SYDNEY kept on in a straight line southeast at about 6 knots. KORMORAN's captain last saw her as a glow (from the fires presumably) on the horizon about midnight. Then the glow disappeared. There were conflicting stories about whether an explosion occurred then. There are also conflicting stories about when SYDNEY disappeared, but Olson shows that those who thought SYDNEY disappeared early were those who abandoned KORMORAN first, and hence only had a sea level view, instead of a bridge view, perhaps thirty feet above the water.
So SYDNEY disappeared a second time. No human eye ever saw her again. SYDNEY was due in Fremantle on 20 November, but it wasn't until the evening of 23 November that the Australian Navy Office radioed SYDNEY ordering her to break radio silence. The first air search did not go out until the morning of 24 November. Incredibly, the search planes were initially told to look for SYDNEY. Thinking they were looking for a 555 foot cruiser, they flew high. The high altitude enabled the planes to search a much broader area. It also made searching for wreckage and survivors much more difficult. Air and sea searches continued until 29 November, but only a life belt and a Carley float were recovered. What made this odd was that a good deal of debris from KORMORAN as well as 400 odd KORMORAN survivors was recovered.
Olson shows us that the battle was fought under circumstances that exposed all the flaws on the British side, and few of the German ones. In order:
1. The Admiralty instructions, stressing the capture of enemy merchant shipping, could not be accomplished without great danger. Significantly, within a month of SYDNEY's loss, revised instructions came out from the Admiralty, stressing destruction of raiders and merchantmen. Never again did a Royal Navy ship set out to capture an enemy ship. Several enemy ships were captured in the course of the war, but this came from sudden advantages in the heat of battle, not as part of a plan at the outset of fighting. (Admiralty fault.)
2. SYDNEY was not built for a close action. As the CORNWALL-PINGUIN battle had shown, even a heavy cruiser could be disabled by a raider. CORNWALL was lucky; SYDNEY was not. SYDNEY, after two years of war, was still loaded with combustibles, paint and wood being far too prominent in her construction. Nor were SYDNEY's secondary guns protected. In a close range action, the gun crews would be blown to bits. Similarly, the torpedo firing stations were not protected against close fire.(Admiralty fault.)
3. SYDNEY sighted KORMORAN from the worst possible angle, the stern, which forced a long chase, and made ship recognition difficult. It also dragged out the chase until evening was near, putting some pressure of Captain Burnett to close before nightfall. (Bad luck.)
4. Captain Burnett was preparing a boarding party, so SYDNEY had to stop. This robbed him of maneuverability. The close range meant his armor gave less protection. He did not have either his secondary armament, nor his port torpedo tubes manned. To be sure, they likely would have been quickly killed, but they also might have fired some shots that could have halted KORMORAN's fire. He also did not launch SYDNEY's float plane, a bad error. 120 gallons of aviation gasoline sitting amidships was a serious fire hazard. It also deprived SYDNEY of a rescue source. Had the plane been launched, it could have called for help, getting a rescue started much earlier. At worst, it could have flown the 220 miles to Australia, and instigated a rescue. (Captain Burnett's fault, Admiralty fault for poor doctrine)
5. The preponderance of the evidence is that Captain Burnett did not break radio silence to report the mystery ship. Olson does describe several stories by witnesses who claim to have heard messages from SYDNEY, but he thinks the witnesses were mistaken or worse. I agree with him. Why shouldn't SYDNEY have reported the discovery? Remember that when CORNWALL had its encounter with a raider, it broke silence. But CORNWALL's captain was criticized for breaking silence. The other answer seems to be that Captain Burnett thought he had a raider supply ship which meant a) there was no need to break silence as SYDNEY could certainly handle and unarmed merchantman and b) if it was a supply ship, capturing it without breaking silence would keep the raider it was supplying ignorant of the capture. It might enable the Royal Navy to track down the raider later.(Captain Burnett's fault, Admiralty fault for poor doctrine, bad luck.)
6. When the action began, SYDNEY and KORMORAN began firing almost simultaneously. SYDNEY's first salvo was high, doing little damage. Almost surely this is because Captain Burnett was following doctrine, and trying to shoot up KORMORAN's bridge to kill KORMORAN's officers and prevent their scuttling KORMORAN. KORMORAN's fire also was aimed high, at the much bigger target SYDNEY's upperworks provided. It did far more damage, most likely by knocking out the fire control, paralyzing SYDNEY's shooting when fast shooting was most necessary. It gave KORMORAN time to damage SYDNEY, and distracted attention from the torpedoes KORMORAN fired, which did the biggest damage to SYDNEY. It may also have killed Captain Burnett and some of his officers. (Admiralty fault for doctrine, bad luck, Captain Burnett's fault---if he was alive.)
7. Early in the action, SYDNEY's foremast toppled, taking the main AND auxiliary radio aerials with it. Result: SYDNEY couldn't call for help. (Admiralty fault for poor design, bad luck.)
8. After being struck by a torpedo, SYDNEY turned toward KORMORAN, trying to comb the tracks of other torpedoes. This was accepted doctrine, a reaction to the Battle of Jutland in World War I, where the commander had turned away from oncoming torpedoes and lost contact with the enemy. But this assumed that a ship was still in fighting condition. By this time, SYDNEY's bow turrets were out of action, and her stern ones were likely jammed on their tracks, and could not "follow" KORMORAN. Her secondary armament and port torpedo tubes, if not out of action, could not be fired for lack of protection from KORMORAN's fire. Turning toward KORMORAN just shortened the range, and, as SYDNEY passed astern of KORMORAN, enabled KORMORAN's port guns, not overheated from rapid firing, to come into action. The turn also opened up a new target: SYDNEY's starboard side. SYDNEY's starboard lifeboats were shot to pieces, as the port ones had been, and more crew were killed. Worse, the torpedo hit had flooded SYDNEY's bows, causing her to list to port and be down by the bow. This raised SYDNEY's waterline, perhaps enough to expose the part not protected by armor. Result: any hits KORMORAN made were likely to penetrate, causing more damage, destroying watertight integrity, and starting more fires. It did give SYDNEY a chance to fire her starboard torpedo tubes, but as it turned out, none of SYDNEY's hit. (Admiralty fault for poor tactics, poor command given by whoever, bad luck.)
9. Earlier in the action, SYDNEY had scored several hits on KORMORAN. Two proved fatal:
a) The first exploded in the fuel bunker, set the oil fuel on fire, and forced the eventual abandonment of the engine room.
b) The second hit destroyed the main fire fighting apparatus, and the auxiliary apparatus was not capable of controlling the fire.
I think that if SYDNEY had not made these two hits, KORMORAN would have followed SYDNEY and sunk her, probably with torpedoes. KORMORAN did fire one torpedo as SYDNEY limped away, but missed. KORMORAN's engines had stopped by then, and there was no chance of pursuit. Had KORMORAN pursued and sunk SYDNEY, there's a chance that KORMORAN could have rescued some of SYDNEY's survivors. As it was, SYDNEY limped away, possibly getting at far as 20 miles from KORMORAN before sinking. This was much too far for KORMORAN's lifeboats to have picked up any survivors. (Bad luck.)
10. This part is shrouded in mystery. KORMORAN survivors last saw SYDNEY as a glow on the horizon, a glow that disappeared around midnight. How did SYDNEY sink? This question is important because the way SYDNEY sank would determine how much debris was left afloat, debris that could attract attention to a searcher. If SYDNEY's fires reached to one of the main magazines, the explosion would presumably have sunk the ship. But it also should have made a big debris field, and possibly a loud enough noise for the KORMORAN survivors to have heard. The accounts of KORMORAN's survivors conflict on hearing a noise. Yet since no big debris field was found, it seems likely that there was no big internal explosion. It's possible the cumulative damage of KORMORAN's shots and torpedo eventually allowed enough water into SYDNEY to sink her. Or, a fire could have caused an ammunition explosion. Olson does not mention this, but when ammunition "cooks off" from a fire, the resulting explosion is almost always much less severe than when a shock wave detonates it. Either way, SYDNEY is not blown apart, and the debris field is much less, much harder for searchers to see. (Bad luck, possible fault in the way damage control was conducted.)
11. The action occurred on the evening of 19 November. SYDNEY was not due until 20 November. The first official notice that she was late did not come until 9:40 AM on 21 November. But then it was learned that the ship SYDNEY had been escorting had arrived a day late. Apparently the inference was that SYDNEY would be a day late. Not until 6:54 PM Sunday 23 November did the Admiralty break radio silence and order SYDNEY to report. No answer. An air search did not begin until 8:00 AM on 24 November. By this time, SYDNEY's survivors had been in the water for four and a half days. Nor were they in boats. At best, they were in Carley floats, which provide no protection from the water. At worst, they were in life jackets. Olson notes the long delay in the search, but does not provide a reason for it. (Admiralty fault, and a serious one.)
12. When the air search began, the pilots were instructed to search for SYDNEY. Result: they flew high, so they could view much bigger expanses of ocean. A 555 foot cruiser should be visible. Was it too high to see any human sized survivors or debris? Olson does not address this issue directly, nor does he say if any of the search flights flew over the site of the battle. But both seem likely. In either case, the air search did not find any debris or survivors. (bad luck, Admiralty fault for poor doctrine.)
13. The air search was abandoned about 3 PM on 29 November. Olson notes that given the temperature of the water, this would be about the time any corpses that had sunk would start coming to the surface because of decomposition. So the search was abandoned just about the time bodies might have been seen. (Bad luck.)
The most tormenting part of the battle and its aftermath has been a) the belief that some form of trickery or b) an outside force was necessary for SYDNEY to be destroyed by KORMORAN. The first is adopted by those who say KORMORAN put up a white flag to lure SYDNEY close, and then fired torpedoes to sink her. The survivors were then machine gunned by KORMORAN so they could tell no tales (firing under the protection of a white flag is a serious violation of the laws of war.) Then, when the KORMORAN's survivors were rescued, they told the Australians that the battle had taken place much farther north than it actually had so any survivors who might have escaped the machine gunning would not be found. The second belief has a Japanese, or Vichy French, submarine joining KORMORAN to sink SYDNEY. The second belief has never been confirmed by either the Japanese or the Vichy archives. The first belief could be overturned if SYDNEY's wreck could be found, which would give the aprozimate postion of where the battle took place, and would be a check of the German's stories. But even in this age of deep sea submersibles, an accurate position is needed. Alas, SYDNEY likely stayed afloat and moved for several hours after the battle. The possible area to be searched could be several hundred square miles. Not surprisingly, the wreck hasn't been discovered.
In my view, such conspiracy theories are ridiculous. Olson shows that there were enough weaknesses in Admiralty doctrine, SYDNEY, SYDNEY's captain and crew, and the search to explain this catastrophe. In saying this, I mean no disrespect to SYDNEY's captain and crew. All were brave men. They fought honorably, and did succeed in destroying their adversary. Nor are the weaknesses that caused SYDNEY's fate isolated. Within three weeks of her sinking, we Americans were to show the same sort of shortsightedness and complacency on a much grander scale at Pearl Harbor, and worse, in the Philippines. For the six months after that, America would be badly beaten by the German U-boats off the East Coast. So this is not an Australian failing alone, by any means. The men aboard SYDNEY paid a high price for failings that were not entirely their own. At that, they may have been lucky. When discussing the search for SYDNEY survivors, Olson recounts the sinking of the USS INDIANAPOLIS. Again, there was a long delay in starting the search, which killed numerous survivors. The US navy's response was to put INDIANPOLIS's captain on court-martial, and give him the works. To be sure, he made several bad errors, but as is common in such cases, the desk bound officers had also made errors---worse ones---yet paid no price. INDIANAPOLIS's captain, in the end paid a nominal penalty in rank reduction, but his career was ruined. In the public eye he was solely to blame, and had to suffer save attacks from the families of those crew who had died. Twenty one years after the sinking, he got one too many hate letters, and shot his brains out. Worse, when the INDIANAPOLIS case was finally given a thorough review, the Navy didn't back down. It took action by Congress to clear the Captain, over Navy protests.
Had Captain Burnett survived the sinking, I think much the same thing would have happened to him. He made serious mistakes (notably 4,5, and possibly 8 and 10 if he hadn't been killed by the time they were made.) Yet his mistakes are far smaller than the faulty Admiralty doctrines that exposed his, and SYDNEY's mistakes and weaknesses. He deserved better from his commanders.
The big disagreement I have with Olson is the title of his book, BITTER VICTORY. Bitter, yes. But a victory for SYDNEY? No. Trading a modern light cruiser for a raider is not a victory. At best it is a draw. You could argue that sinking KORMORAN saved much Allied shipping later on, and hence qualifies as a victory. But then you have to add that SYDNEY could no longer escort Allied ships, or fight Axis ships. Striking that balance, I think the Allies lose. More, KORMORAN sank because of lucky hits. SYDNEY sank because KORMORAN beat the tar out of her. KORMORAN's captain sank his ship to keep it out of Allied hands, not because it was hopelessly damaged. This is another bitter pill for Australians and their admirers (of whom I count myself as one) to swallow. Facing these facts does not take away from the bravery of SYDNEY's crew and captain, who deserve great honor for their fight. They did not quit fighting, though the battle went against them from the start. Raising the possibility of dirty tricks, coverups, and mysterious interventions by otherwise invisible submarines does no credit to SYDNEY's officers and men. Ironically, it shores up the faulty doctrines of the Admiralty, which deserve much harsher censure than they have received. Add more irony: the conspiracy theorists accuse the wartime governments and their successors of covering up what "really" happened, when their own theories cover up faulty doctrine far more effectively. Olson deserves the highest praise for his skill at digging up facts, and assembling them to come to what is likely to be the closest anyone will ever come to answering the puzzle of the SYDNEY. I said in my original post that I hope he writes many more books. I stand by this, and will devour all he publishes.
Tom, I apologize for hijacking your topic at such enormous length, and taking so long to do it. I hope the results repay reading.
Best regards,
Gregory Koster
![[info]](http://l-stat.livejournal.com/img/userinfo.gif){kind=small}
gloomy
mischievous
excited